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CERCLA SECTION 107: AN
EXAMINATION OF CAUSATION
INTRODUCTION
National attention has focused in recent years on environmental
damage wrought by the improper treatment and disposal of hazardous
waste.' The comprehensiveness of the federal government's response
reflects the enormity of the problem, both in public health and in eeo-
nomic terms.2 Parties injured by hazardous waste may often resort to
I. See Belthoff, Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107 of CERCLA, 11
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141 (1986) (the inadequate disposal of hazardous wastes has
piqued our nation's environmental awareness); Comment, Personal Liability for Haz-
ardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENvTL. AFF.
L. REV. 643 (1986) (congressional responses to the growing problem of improper dispo-
sal of hazardous waste); see also infra note 2 and accompanying text discussing the
magnitude of the hazardous waste disposal problem.
2. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) to facilitate the clean-up of hazardous waste, to
impose liability upon responsible parties, and to adequately compensate injured parties.
See Belthoff, supra note 1, at 144 ("the major purpose behind CERCLA is to remedy
the inadequacies of prior environmental legislation"); Developments-Toxic Waste Liti-
gation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1496-98 (1986) (CERCLA's objectives include the
cleanup of contaminated disposal sites and the assessment of liability) [hereinafter De-
velopments]; Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2
(1982) (Congress enacted CERCLA to protect public health and the environment);
Hinds, Liability Under Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1982) (Congress enacted CERCLA to promote containment, cleanup, and
removal of hazardous waste); Comment, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Clean-
up: An Examination of CERCLA Section 107, 13 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 643, 650
(1986) ("Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous sites
as well as to provide the necessary financing."); Comment, Interpreting "Owner" and
"Operator" Liability Under CERCLA: Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988), 38 WAsH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 229, 233 (1990)
(outlining CERCLA's purposes).
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traditional common law tort theories to obtain relief from identifiable
polluters.' Plaintiffs relying upon common law theories typically assert
nuisance, trespass, negligence, or strict liability claims.4 The plaintiff
carries the burden to prove her prima facie case for each claim.5 The
causation element, however, often creates proof problems.6 For that
reason, at least one commentator has referred to causation as the "bete
noire" of toxic tort litigation.7
To complement common law remedies, both state8 and federal 9 gov-
ernments have enacted remedial environmental legislation. ° The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA)1 ' represents the key federal response aimed at facili-
3. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1980) (Congress does not intend
to supplant common law remedies through enactment of federal legislation); Belfiglio,
Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REV. 675, 675-77
(1981) (same); see also Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986
CERCLA Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365, 367 (1987) (CERCLA does not sup-
plant common law rights and remedies that otherwise exist for injured parties); Hinds,
supra note 2, at 2 (discussing the variety of common law remedies available to an in-
jured plaintiff); Johnson, Hazardous Waste Disposal. Is There Still a Role for Common
Law?, 18 TULSA L.J. 448, 451 (1983) ("Traditionally, the law of torts has been the
primary common law approach to environmental issues.").
4. See Belfiglio, supra note 3, at 676 n.7. See also R. HALL, T. WATSON, J. DAVID-
SON & D. CASE, HAZARDOUS WASTES HANDBOOK §§ 14.6-.7, at 14-8 to 14-16 (5th ed.
1984). Common law continues to expand in the field of toxic torts. State courts and
legislatures have eased the plaintiffs' burden of proof to be recompensed. Four theories
have developed toward this end: (1) concert of action; (2) enterprise liability; (3) alter-
native liability; and (4) market share liability. Id. § 14.6, at 14-8 to 14-12.
Although this expansion will provide an injured plaintiff increased access to relief, it
will pose added risks and costs of doing business for any company handling hazardous
substances. Id. § 14.8, at 14-16.
5. W. PROSSER & V. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 269 (5th ed. 1984).
6. Id.
7. Parker, Not a Drop to Drink- Remedies For Water Contamination, TRIAL, Feb.
1989, at 87.
8. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 451 n.5 (citing state statutes that have been enacted
to remedy environmental pollution problems); State Superfund Statutes 1984, ENVTL.
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) (Nov. 1983) (booklet outlining state Superfund statutes).
9. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 12 (1980) ("[CERCLA] is not
intended to replace other laws which aim to correct a variety of toxic chemical concerns
... [including] [t]he Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Substances Control
Act, [and] the Solid Waste Disposal Act ..
10. Johnson, supra note 3, at 450.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9678 (1988). See Belthoff, supra note 1, at 144 (the purpose
of CERCLA is to remedy the inadequacies of prior environmental legislation); Grad,
supra note 2, at 2 (CERCLA sufficiently authorizes the clean-up of hazardous waste);
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tating the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste and imposing liability
upon responsible parties. CERCLA, however, only covers clean-up
costs; it does not provide compensation for personal injuries or prop-
erty damage. 1
2
Consistent with common law remedies, a plaintiff who asserts a
CERCLA action under section 107(a) must carry the burden of mak-
ing her prima facie case.13 Some courts' 4 construe section 107(a) of
Comment, supra note 1, at 643 (CERCLA primarily focuses on the clean-up of hazard-
ous waste).
12. CERCLA § 309, Actions under State laws for damages from exposure to haz-
ardous substances, provides in pertinent part:
(a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substances cases
(1) EXCEPTION TO STATE STATUTES
In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury or
property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any haz-
ardous substance or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment
from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified
in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commence-
ment date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date,
such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in
lieu of the date specified in such State statute.
(3) ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 9607
Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to any case of action brought
under Section 9607 of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 9658 (1988). That language indicates that any damages sought for personal
injury or property must be brought under state or common law, not CERCLA.
13. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Although
not expressly spelled out in the statute, courts have interpreted § 107(a) to require a
plaintiff to show four elements in order to establish a prima facie case: (1) the generator
disposed of hazardous substance; (2) the act took place at a facility which contained at
the time of discovery hazardous substances of the kind which the generator disposed;
(3) there occurred a release or a threatened release of that or any hazardous substance;
(4) such release triggered the incurrence of response costs. Id.
See also New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1985) (plain-
tiff must establish the elements contained in CERCLA § 107(a) before obtaining relief);
Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (D.R.I. 1986) (after stripping CERCLA
§ 107(a) of its excessive language, courts require a plaintiff to prove the four basic ele-
ments); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 184 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (same); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893-94 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (same);
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (plaintiff must establish the elements contained in § 107(a) before
obtaining relief), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) (outlining the elements of a prima facie case).
14. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 716 F. Supp. 676,
683 (D. Mass. 1989) (the state must introduce evidence of damages which proximately
stems from the injury to the environment); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms,
Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Mass. 1988) (plaintiff must establish that the contamination
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
86 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 40:83
CERCLA to require traditional common law proximate causation.1
Most courts, however, interpret section 107 to relieve a plaintiff from
the burden of proving causation and instead permit recovery of re-
sponse costs upon merely showing that a defendant released or
threatened to release hazardous substances. 16
of her facility resulted in fact from migration of chemicals from an off-site facility in
order to recover response costs), rev'd sub nom. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (lst Cir. 1989); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986) (plaintiff must establish causal link between releases and
post-enactment damages in order to recover damages to natural resources).
15. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, §§ 41-45, at 263-321. Prosser
and Keeton restate the two major theories of proximate cause as follows: (1) The scope
of liability should ordinarily extend to, but not beyond, the scope of "foreseeable risks"-
- that is, the risks by reason of which the actor's conduct is held to be negligent; (2) the
scope of liability should ordinarily extend to, but not beyond, all "direct consequences"
and those foreseeable indirect consequences. Id. § 42, at 273. See, e.g., Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (Cardozo's majority position
exemplifies the "foreseeable risks" proximate cause test; Andrews' dissenting opinion
exemplifies the "direct consequences" proximate cause test).
16. See, eg., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (showing
of chemical similarity between hazardous substances released from waste storage facil-
ity and chemical waste of defendants who generated and stored chemical waste at the
facility suffices to create CERCLA liability), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (CERCLA § 107(a)(1) "unequivocally imposes strict liability
on the current owner of a facility from which there was a release or threat of release,
without regard to causation"); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 623 (D.N.H.
1988) (plaintiff need not prove off-site pollution actually caused response costs in order
to recover response costs under CERCLA); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298,
1309 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (under CERCLA, "traditional tort notions, such as proximate
cause, do not apply"); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (case law and legislative history indicate that CERCLA § 107(a) contains no cau-
sation requirement); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Md. 1986) (CERCLA § 107 imposes strict liability without regard to causation); United
States v. B. R. Mackay & Sons, Inc., 13 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 253, 258 (N.D. Ill.
1986) ("the court has found no case, and defendants have cited none, that arrives at a
contrary conclusion: CERCLA section 107(a) does not require proof of causation");
United States v. Tyson, 12 Chem. Waste Lit. Rep. 872, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Picillo, 648
F. Supp. 1283 (CERCLA requires only a minimal causal nexus between the defendant's
hazardous waste and the harm caused by the release at a particular site); United States
v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (generators found liable under
CERCLA in light of their failure to show that all their drums had been removed prior
to clean-up); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 234 (W.D.
Mo. 1985) (a generator whose hazardous substances are treated or disposed of at any
site owned or operated by someone other than the generator is liable for response costs
incurred with respect to that site); Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 610 F.
Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (CERCLA imposes liability upon those who arranged for
disposal of released hazardous substances even though a third party ultimately trans-
ported the waste to the contaminated site); United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep.
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Part I of this Note addresses the CERCLA causation element by
examining CERCLA's legislative history and statutory scheme. Part
II discusses the relevant case law. Finally, Part III provides an analy-
sis of the standard of causation that courts should require for a plaintiff
to satisfy her prima facie case under CERCLA.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated in 1980 that
the United States produces 57 million metric tons of hazardous waste,
or about 600 pounds of hazardous waste per American each year. 7
This amount was projected to grow at an annual rate of 3.5%. 8 More-
over, the EPA found that industry disposed of an astonishing 90% of
this waste in environmentally unsound ways.' 9 Although both com-
mon law theories and federal environmental legislation existed at that
time, neither adequately addressed this critical problem.
20
In 1980, Congress sought to counter the burgeoning environmental
menace posed by hazardous waste through the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.2
Cas. (BNA) 2167 (1984) (government may maintain CERCLA action to recover clean-
up costs absent proof that defendant proximately caused release of hazardous substance
into environment); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same);
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1114 n.11 (D.N.J. 1983) (proximate cause not
required for a plaintiff to recover response costs under CERCLA); see also Develop-
ments, supra note 2, at 1520-24 (discussing standards of causation).
17 S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
18. Id.
19. H. R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6124. See supra note 2 and accompanying text
for discussion of the magnitude of the problem of improper disposal of hazardous waste.
20 H. R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6123. Some examples of federal legislation that
have been enacted include the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act. Id.
21. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. Prior to the enactment of CERCLA, Congress passed
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 3008(d),
90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992i (West 1983 & Supp.
1990)) [hereinafter RCRA]. That legislation focused on the management and regula-
tion of hazardous waste disposal. RCRA, often referred to as an example of "cradle-to-
grave" legislation, authorized the regulation of hazardous waste from the time of its
creation to the time of its disposal. RCRA, however, failed to address the problem of
abandoned hazardous waste sites. This omission prompted Congress to fill in the regu-
19911
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CERCLA primarily facilitates the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste
sites by providing the necessary financing of both governmental and
private responses.22 It also places the ultimate financial burden upon
those parties responsible for the damage.23
In particular, CERCLA section 107 imposes liability upon four cate-
gories of potentially responsible parties for hazardous waste clean-up
costs. 24 This section further authorizes courts to hold the responsible
latory gaps by enacting CERCLA. See H. R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
1, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125; S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10-11 (1980); Comment, supra note 1, at 646-48; see also
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985) ("deficiencies in
RCRA have left regulatory gaps"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984) ("It was the precise inadequacies
resulting from RCRA's lack of applicability to inactive and abandoned hazardous waste
disposal sites that prompted the passage of CERCLA."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. A. & F. Materials Co.,
578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (Congress passed CERCLA to fill serious gaps
in RCRA); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (noting inap-
plicability of RCRA to thousands of dormant sites that are not currently posing an
"imminent hazard" (quoting H. R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6125)); United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 n.2 (D. Minn. 1982) ("Both the
House and the Senate Committee Reports express the need for prompt action, concern
over inadequacies of existing legislation, and detail the magnitude of the problems
caused by hazardous waste disposal in this country.").
22. See generally H. R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119. The 96th Congress hastily passed
CERCLA during its closing days. Price, 577 F. Supp. at 1109. Consequently, CER-
CLA's legislative history is very scant. Nonetheless, the members of Congress who
favored the compromise version of CERCLA viewed it as an opportunity to resolve
quickly the major problems associated with hazardous waste disposal. They also feared
that waiting to pass similar legislation in the next congressional session would only
result in a more diluted version of CERCLA. See Belthoff, supra note 1, at 144; Grad,
supra note 2, at 34.
23. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text for a discussion of policies underly-
ing CERCLA.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). Section 107 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section - -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by
any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and
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parties strictly liable for three kinds of costs incurred as a result of a
release or a threatened release of hazardous waste: (1) governmental
response costs, (2) private response costs, and (3) damages to natural
resources.
25
Nonetheless, CERCLA's standard of causation admits of certain
ambiguity. 26  Prior to CERCLA's passage, Congress specifically re-
jected a provision in the original House bill demanding a causation
requirement in section 107(a).27 That House version contained a cau-
sation requirement imposing liability upon "any person who caused or
contributed to the release or threatened release" 28 of a hazardous sub-
stance. By contrast, the final compromise version contained no express
causation requirement.29 Nevertheless, courts have consistently inter-
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport
to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for - -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
25. Comment, supra note 1, at 653-54 (discussing CERCLA's liability scheme).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). For the text of the statute, see supra note 24.
27. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985). See
generally Grad, supra note 2 (discussing CERCLA's legislative history).
28. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a) (1980), quoted in Shore Realty,
759 F.2d at 1044. The House proposal is summarized as follows:
mhe usual common law principles of causation, including those of proximate cau-
sation, should govern the determination of whether a defendant "caused or con-
tributed" to a release or threatened release.... Thus, for instance, the mere act of
generation or transportation of hazardous waste or the mere existence of a genera-
tor's or transporter's waste in a site with respect to which cleanup costs are in-
curred would not, in and of itself, result in liability.... [Flor liability to attach
under this section, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal or contributory nexus
between the acts of the defendant and the conditions which necessitated response
action.
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6136-37.
29. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (citing 126 CONG. REc. 31,981-82 (1980));
1991]
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preted CERCLA as authorizing strict liability,30 and a majority have
construed section 107(a)(3) to require only a minimal causal connec-
tion.31 The courts, however, have not yet reached a consensus in ap-
plying a uniform causation standard to all CERCLA claims.32
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
CERCLA provides a right of action to governments and private in-
dividuals.3 3 Four elements make up a prima facie case under CER-
see also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.10 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Many
courts have provided succinct analyses of CERCLA's legislative history. ... which are
instructive but need not be repeated here because of the clarity of the liability provisions
at issue."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080-82 (lst Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1068-79 (D. Colo. 1985) (same); United States v. Price, 577
F. Supp. 1103, 1114 n. 11 (D.N.J. 1983) ("Congress eliminated any language requiring
plaintiff to prove proximate cause."); United States v. Cauffman, 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2167, 2168 (1984); Developments, supra note 2, at 1520 ("Courts have inter-
preted CERCLA to require only a very weak showing of causation. This broadening of
the traditional standard of tort common law is justified, however, by the special difficul-
ties of proof in hazardous waste cases.").
30. See, e.g., General Elec. v. Litton Industries, 920 F.2d 1415, 1417 (8th Cir. 1990)
(liability under CERCLA is unequivocally strict); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759
F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 992 (D.S.C. 1986) (same), aff'd in part and vacated in
part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986)
(same); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (same); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (1985) (same); United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp 823, 844 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (same); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (same); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
31. See supra note 16 and accompanying text citing pertinent case law.
32. See infra notes 47-93 and accompanying text discussing the cases that require
only a minimal causal nexus for response costs. But cf. infra notes 130-44 discussing
the cases that demand proximate cause with regard to costs for damages to natural
resources.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). For the text of this section, see supra note 24.
See Belthoff, supra note 1, at 152 (almost every court holds or implies that CERCLA
§ 107 creates a private right of action); see also, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989) (CERCLA § 107 provides a
private right of action); Pinhole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (same); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 72, 77 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (same); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589
F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (same); Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425,
1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (same); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 253
(D.N.J. 1983) (same); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1373, 1375
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CLA.3 4 To wit, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant falls
within one of the four categories of covered persons;35 (2) a "release or
threatened release" of a hazardous substance3 6 from the defendant's
facility occurred;37 (3) the release or threatened release "cause[d] the
incurrence of response costs" by the plaintiff,38 and (4) the plaintiff's
costs were necessary costs of response consistent with the National
Contingency Plan (NCP).39
In "one-site" CERCLA section 107 cases, where a substance con-
taminates the site of its release, courts consistently have refused to re-
(1983) (same); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
34. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1511-42; Comment, supra note 1, at 653; see
also, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989) (to establish
a prima facie case the plaintiff must prove: (1) That the site in question is a "facility";
(2) that the defendant is a responsible person; (3) that a release or threatened release of a
hazardous substance has occurred; and (4) that the release has caused the plaintiff to
incur response costs); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53
(9th Cir. 1989) (same); Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 994, 999
(D.N.J.) (same), reargued, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,738 (D.N.J. Nov. 23,
1988).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). See supra note 24 for text of statute.
36. Section 101(14) of CERCLA defines a "hazardous substance" as:
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321 (b)(2)(A) of title 33 [the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or Clean Water Act], (B) any element, com-
pound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this
title [CERCLA], (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.
6921] .... (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 33.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
37. Id. § 9607(a)(3). See supra note 24 for text of statute.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). While CERCLA does not define the term "re-
sponse costs," it does define the word "response" as "remove, removal, remedy and
remedial action." Id. § 9601(25). Generally, removal actions are those intended for the
short-term abatement of toxic waste hazards, while remedial actions are those intended
to restore long-term environmental quality. Id. § 9601(23)-(24). See New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1040 (2d Cir. 1985); Artesian Water Co. v. Govern-
ment of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d
643 (3d Cir. 1988).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). See supra note 24 for text of statute. Consistency
with various versions of the NCP is not an element of CERCLA § 107 liability. Rather,
when liability is established, the court will then test the incurred response costs for
consistency with the NCP in order to determine the extent of cost recovery to which the
plaintiff is entitled. See, e.g., Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1047-48 (inclusion on the NCP
is not required for the state to recover under CERCLA); United States v. Reilly Tar &
Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118-19 (D. Minn. 1982) (same).
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quire plaintiffs to demonstrate proximate cause.4 Rather, courts
require a lesser causation standard.41 This diminished standard pre-
sumably effectuates the statutory goals of promptly cleaning up con-
taminated sites and exacting recovery costs from responsible parties.42
Only a few courts, however, have addressed the causation standard
with regard to response costs in "two-site" cases.4 3 Two-site cases are
those in which released substances from one site contaminate an off-site
facility. Short of requiring proximate cause, courts faced with this situ-
ation have adopted a variety of causation standards.' As distin-
guished from CERCLA claims for response costs,45 however, plaintiffs
seeking compensation for natural resource damages pursuant to CER-
CLA section 107(f) generally must prove proximate causation.46
A. One-Site CERCLA Cases
United States v. Wade 47 marks the first judicial determination on
one-site injuries under CERCLA.4 s In Wade, the Government
brought an action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against own-
ers, generators, and transporters of hazardous substances, alleging
those persons responsible for creating an illegal dump site.49 The
court, in holding the generator defendants liable, rejected their defense
premised on traditional tort concepts of proximate causation.50
40. See infra notes 47-93 and accompanying text for discussion of one-site CER-
CLA cases.
41. S. COOKE, LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIAnIL-
n-Y AND LITIGATION § 14.01(5)(d), at 14-86 (1988). See infra notes 67-92 and accom-
panying text discussing cases requiring a minimal causal nexus under CERCLA.
42. See supra notes 1-2 & 20-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of CER-
CLA's purposes and legislative history.
43. See infra notes 93-129 and accompanying text for discussion of two-site CER-
CLA cases.
44. See infra notes 47-144 and accompanying text illustrating different causation
standards which courts impose.
45. See infra notes 47-129 and accompanying text for discussion of cases concerning
response costs recovery under CERCLA.
46. See infra notes 130-44 and accompanying text for discussion of cases concerning
recovery for damages to natural resources under CERCLA.
47. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
48. Id. See also supra note 40, § 14.01(5)(d), at 14-86.
49. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1327.
50. Id. at 1332. The defendants argued that the Government must prove that each
defendant's waste was actually present at the site and was the subject of a removal or
remedial measure. Id. at 1331. They further contended that the Government must at
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In so ruling, the district court first considered the language of section
107.5" Section 107 imposes liability upon "any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treat-
ment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs."52 The court noted section 107's ambigu-
ities. 3 Specifically, the court focused on Congress' use of the qualifier
"such" in reference to hazardous substances contained at the site or
facility.54 The court opined that "such," when read with the proceed-
ing language, may require that the facility contain a particular defend-
ant's waste." Alternatively, the court explained that it may merely
require that hazardous substances "like" those found in the defendant's
waste be present at the site.56 The court next surveyed CERCLA's
scant legislative history and concluded that Congress intended that
courts apply the less stringent causation standard. 7 Finally, the court
reasoned that to require a plaintiff to "fingerprint" wastes by identify-
ing who generated each substance would eviscerate the statute.58
The court determined, moreover, that the Government need not link
its clean-up costs to the particular wastes that each generator sent to
the site.59 To reach this result, the court distilled from section 107 a
least link its incurred costs to the particular waste produced by each generator before
that generator could be held liable. Id.
51. Id. at 1332-34.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988).
53. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332. See also United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp.
898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-
drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history."); United
States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983) (Congress drafted CERCLA
hastily and inadequately thus making it difficult to pinpoint the scope of the legislation);
Developments, supra note 2, at 1465 & n. 1.
54. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. Courts customarily begin their statutory construction with the statute's lan-
guage. When the terms of the statute are ambiguous, courts review the legislative his-
tory to interpret the language in a way consistent with congressional intent. See
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 56-58 (1987) (starting
point for statutory analysis is the statute itself).
58. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1332. The court explained that the scientific techniques
currently available can only determine that a site contains the same generic list of haz-
ardous substances as those in a generator's waste. Id.
59. Id.
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four-part test representing the necessary elements of a prima facie case:
(1) the generator disposed of its hazardous substances' ° (2) at a facility
containing hazardous substances similar to those disposed of by the
generator61 (3) and such facility released a hazardous substance 62 (4)
which caused the incurrence of response costs.63
Assessing the test and its components," the court concluded that the
Government discharges its burden of proof regarding causation upon
merely showing that a defendant disposed of hazardous waste which is
found both at the defendant's plant and the disposal site.65 As support
for this reading, the court noted that Congress deleted the proximate
cause language from the original House bill, evidencing a legislative
purpose to dilute the traditional common law causation requirement.66
Thus, the Wade court dispensed with proximate causation as a prereq-
uisite for liability under CERCLA.67
Federal district6" and appellate69 courts concur that CERCLA re-
quires a plaintiff to prove only a minimal causal nexus between a de-
fendant's disposed of substance and the response costs incurred.70 For
example, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Monsanto Co.71 af-
firmed the South Carolina District Court's decision in United States v.
60. See supra note 36 for the definition of hazardous substance.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1988). See supra note 24 for text of statute.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). See supra note 24 for text of statute.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1988). See supra note 24 for text of statute.
64. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333.
65. Id. See supra note 24 for text of CERCLA § 107(a).
The court specified that the release referred to in § 107(a) is "of 'a' hazardous sub-
stance." Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1333. The use of "a" suggested that the released sub-
stance need not be one contained in every generator's wastes. Id. The use of "such,"
however, in the paragraph concerning substances found at the site suggested that the list
of wastes sent by the generator must at least be present at "the" site, though not neces-
sarily among the substances released, before that generator may be held liable. Id.
66. Wade, 577 F. Supp. at 1334.
67. Id.
* 68. See supra note 16 citing federal district court CERCLA cases that do not re-
quire proximate cause.
69. See id.
70. See generally Developments, supra note 2, at 1520-84.
71. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'g in part and vacating in part United States v.
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
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South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI),72 thus attenuating
the CERCLA section 107(a)(4) causation element.73
In SCRDI, the Government sued owners, operators, generators and
transporters of hazardous waste under CERCLA.74 The Government
claimed that the defendants disposed of hazardous waste which re-
leased and threatened to release at a site used for waste brokering and
recycling. 7" After examining section 107(a),76 the court cited Wade's
casual nexus analysis with approval.77 The court claimed that the stat-
ute's express terms defined and limited the Government's burden of
proof.78 In holding for the Government, the SCRDI court explained
that CERCLA "takes into account the synergistic potential of improp-
erly managed hazardous substances and essentially presumes a contrib-
utory 'causal' relationship between each of the hazardous substances
disposed of at a site and the hazardous conditions existing at the
site.
'79
72. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986), aff'd in part and vacated in part, United States
v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
73. Id. at 992.
74. Id. at 989.
75. Id. at 990. In SCRDI, an environmental hazard of staggering proportions de-
veloped shortly after the incorporation of waste brokering and recycling operation. Id.
Approximately 7200 55-gallon drums of hazardous substances accumulated at the site.
Id. The drums were randomly and haphazardly stacked upon one another. Id. Deteri-
oration of the drums caused their hazardous contents to leak and ooze onto the ground
and other drums. Id. Fires and explosions broke out because the substances mixed
with external elements and other hazardous substances. Id.
76. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text for discussion of a prima facie
CERCLA case.
77. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 992. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text for
discussion of the Wade analysis.
78. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 992.
79. Id. at 992 n.5. The court also noted that the defendant may rebut the presump-
tion of a "causal" relationship under § 107(b) of CERCLA. Id. To rebut the presump-
tion, the defendant must show that the conditions at the site were caused solely by a
person unrelated contractually to that defendant. Id. Section 107(b) provides:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person other-
wise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; or
(3) an act or omission of a third party....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). In SCRDI, none of the defendants provided evidence to
satisfy that requirement. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 992 n.5.
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Although the SCRDI court purportedly followed Wade's test for
causation,8" it opened a possible loophole for generators. 81 The court
noted that generators may avoid liability by proving that their wastes
were removed from the contaminated site before the government initi-
ated clean-up operations.82 Nevertheless, proof of complete removal of
hazardous wastes presents a formidable task for CERCLA
defendants.83
While courts generally apply the Wade test in CERCLA cases in-
volving generator liability, 84 the Second Circuit in New York v. Shore
Realty Corp.85 extended the test to owners and operators.86 In Shore
Realty, the court held Shore strictly liable for the state's response costs
without regard to causation.87 The court examined the structure of
80. See supra notes 47-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of United States
v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
81. See S. COOKE, supra note 41, § 14.01(5)(a).
82. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 993 n.6.
83. S. COOKE, supra note 41, § 14.01(5)(d), at 14-91 (a defendant can avoid liability
if she can show that all of her wastes were removed prior to the government's clean-up).
See also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1403 (D.N.H. 1985)
("Under CERCLA, there is no allowance for leaving 'some' or a 'few' drums; the stat-
ute holds liable and penalizes anyone who left such hazardous waste on the site where
such waste was or had to be removed by the government." (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a));
Developments, supra note 2, at 1521 (government experts concede that it is virtually
impossible for a defendant to rebut presumption of causation).
84. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Bliss, 667
F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053 (C.D.
Cal. 1987); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986); United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Missouri v. Independent Pe-
trochemical Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Cauffman, 21
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2167 (1984); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982).
85. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). In Shore Realty, the State of New York sued the
corporation and Donald LeoGrande, the officer and stockholder who controlled and
directed all corporate decisions, to clean up the contaminated site. Id. at 1037. At the
time of acquisition, LeoGrande knew about the storage of more than 700,000 gallons of
hazardous waste on the premises. Id. Nevertheless, the corporation acquired the site
from the state for land development purposes. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1044. The court additionally noted that a finding that CERCLA § 107(a)
imposes strict liability does not rebut Shore's causation argument. Id. at 1044 n.17.
Traditional tort law has often imposed strict liability while recognizing a causation de-
fense. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 79, at 560; see also supra note 16
and accompanying text discussing strict liability.
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section 107 and reasoned that a causation requirement would render
the affirmative defenses provided in section 107(b) superfluous.88 Ab-
sent a clear congressional command, the Shore Realty court refused to
interpret the statute to require proximate cause.8 9 The court further
maintained that Congress' rejection of a causation requirement from
the original House bill supported its conclusion.' ° Thus, in one-site
cases, the plaintiff is spared the burden of showing that a waste genera-
tor9 or a site owner or operator9 2 proximately caused the alleged
harms as a part of its prima facie case under CERCLA.9 3
B. Two-Site CERCLA Cases
In contrast to the many one-site decisions,94 relatively few courts
have addressed causation under CERCLA for incidents of two-site pol-
lution.9 5 The Third Circuit first discussed the causation question in
Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County.9 6 In Artesian,
a water company sought recovery for its response costs in monitoring
and evaluating the impact on its wells of leachate from an adjacent
landfill.97 Applying a substantial factor rule9 8 of causation, the court
88. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. See supra note 24 for text of § 9607(b).
89. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1045.
90. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3071(a) (1980).
91. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text discussing the SCRDI case.
92. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text for discussion of the Shore Realty
case.
93. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for the prima facie test.
94. See supra notes 47-93 for a discussion of one-site CERCLA generator cases.
95. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (lst
Cir. 1989)(holding proximate causal nexus is not required for plaintiff to establish her
prima facie case to recover response costs). But see Artesian Water Co. v. Government
of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a substantial factor
test applies to determine the causation element required for a plaintiff to prove her
prima facie case).
96. 659 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Del. 1981), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988).
97. Id. at 1276.
98. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 41, at 267. The substantial factor
rule of causation is as follows: The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. Whether it was a sub-
stantial factor is for the jury to determine, unless the issue is so clear that reasonable
persons could not differ. Id. The substantial factor test greatly differs from the Wade
causation scheme. Under the substantial factor test, a defendant's conduct must in fact
cause injury to the plaintiff in order for the defendant to be liable. Id. By contrast, the
Wade test merely requires that the defendant release or threaten to release a hazardous
substance which is found both at the defendant's facility and the plaintiff's site. In
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found the plaintiff entitled to relief.99 The court stated first that CER-
CLA's strict liability scheme requires that a plaintiff demonstrate a
causal connection between the defendant's released substance and the
response costs incurred."co The court then rejected a "but-for" causa-
tion test 01 because more than two causes acted concurrently to bring
about the harm. Further, any one of the causes, acting alone, would
have produced the same injury." 2 Accordingly, the court ruled that if
the release or threatened release of contaminants from the defendant's
site is a substantial factor in causing a plaintiff to incur response costs,
then the court will hold the defendant liable under CERCLA. 10 3
Unlike the Third Circuit," 4 the First Circuit declined to adopt the
common law substantial factor test for two-site CERCLA actions.105
In Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. ,106 a public
water utility10 7 sued the owner of a truck maintenance facility, 10 ' alleg-
addition, the plaintiff must incur response costs resulting from the released substance.
United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
99. Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1283.
100. Id. at 1282. See, ag., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044
n.17 (2d Cir. 1985); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986).
The court further required that Artesian show that it incurred costs as a result of the
release or threatened release of hazardous substances from the site. Artesian, 659 F.
Supp. at 1282.
101. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 5, § 41, at 266. The "but for" causa-
tion test provides that "[the defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event
would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is
not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it." Id.
102. Artesian, 659 F. Supp. at 1283.
103. Id. In Artesian, other factors contributed to the contamination of the site.
Those factors included pollutants from the Delaware Sand and Gravel landfill, saltwater
intrusion, and the Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Control's aquifer management policy. Id.
104. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text for discussion of the Artesian
case.
105. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (Ist Cir.
1989).
106. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Mass.
1988), rev'd sub nom. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d
1146 (1st Cir. 1989).
107. Dedham Water, 889 F.2d at 1148. Dedham Water is a regulated public water
utility supplying drinking water to approximately 40,000 persons in Dedham and West-
wood, Massachusetts. Id.
108. Id. Cumberland Farms, a truck maintenance facility located in Canton, Mas-
sachusetts, used substantial quantities of solvents and degreasers containing volatile or-
ganic chemicals (VOCs). Id. Its mechanics regularly dumped these solvents and liquid
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ing that chemical discharges from Cumberland Farm's facility caused
ground water contamination."°9 Dedham Water sought monetary re-
lief, claiming entitlement to response costs under CERCLA." °
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
found Cumberland Farms not liable under CERCLA.11' The court
held that in order to recover damages, a plaintiff in a two-site case must
prove that the defendant's hazardous substances actually migrated to
and contaminated the plaintiff's site."' 2 In reaching its conclusion, the
court first examined the language of section 107(a). 3 The court read
the language to expressly require a causal link between the plaintiff's
injury and the defendant's release or threatened release of hazardous
substances." 4 Next, the court distinguished one-site CERCLA cases
from two-site cases." 5 For two-site cases, the court concluded that
CERCLA requires the following standard of causation: Whether the
defendant's releases of hazardous substances had any effect at all upon
wastes directly into drains and catch basins which were connected to a drainage pipe.
Id. The drainage pipe, owned by Cumberland Farms and known as the Northwest
Storm Sewer Outfall, discharged directly into a drainage ditch which flowed toward the
White Lodge Well Field, approximately 1000 feet north of Cumberland Farms. Id.
Ultimately the solvents discharged into the Neponset River. Id.
In early 1979, Dedham Water discovered hazardous substances in two of its wells.
Id. Based upon a survey it made of surrounding surface waters, Dedham Water be-
lieved that Cumberland Farms caused the contamination. Id. Subsequently, Dedham
Water informed the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering
(DEQE) of the contamination. Id. The DEQE then assumed responsibility for the
investigation. Id. In April, Dedham Water closed the two contaminated wells. Id.
The DEQE notified Cumberland Farms that hazardous substances also contaminated
its wells. Id. In addition, the DEQE requested Cumberland Farms to analyze the
water and send them the results so proper remedial action could be taken. Id. Ulti-
mately, Cumberland Farms shut down the effected well. Id. Dedham Water took vari-
ous steps to prevent contamination of its other wells including retaining an engineering
firm to make recommendations. Id. at 1149. The firm recommended that Dedham
Water build a water treatment plant. Id. In March 1987, Dedham Water approved the
recommendation and constructed a plant. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1146. See supra note 38 for the definition of response costs under
CERCLA.
111. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1223, 1235 (D.
Mass. 1988).
112. Id. at 1224.
113. Id.
114. Id. See supra note 24 for text of § 107(a)(4).
115. Dedham Water, 689 F. Supp. at 1225-26. See supra text accompanying notes
40-44 for definitions of one-site and two-site CERCLA cases respectively.
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the plaintiff's site.116 After hearing extensive expert testimony from
both sides, the court decided that Cumberland Farms did not in fact
cause Dedham Water's facility to become contaminated. 1 7 Accord-
ingly, Cumberland Farms was not held liable for response costs in-
curred by Dedham Water.118
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's119
decision.120 The court held that a plaintiff need not prove that the de-
fendant's waste actually contaminated the site as a precondition to re-
covery.121 Rather, the plaintiff merely must establish that the
defendant's releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances
caused the plaintiff to incur response costs. 122 As with the court below,
the First Circuit focused on the wording of CERCLA section
107(a).1 23 The court stated that a literal reading would not restrict lia-
bility to cases where the defendant causes actual contamination of a
plaintiff's property.124 In making its determination, the court reasoned
that the absence of proximate cause language in CERCLA evinced a
congressional intent that strict liability attach to releases or threatened
116. Dedham Water, 689 F. Supp. at 1226. The court explained that the causation
issue involves two distinct questions: (1) "whether groundwater from defendant's side
of the Neponset River is drawn under the river into the White Lodge Well #3 (WL-3);
and [2] whether contaminants from the Cumberland Farms site entered the ground-
water and then were drawn under the Neponset River to WL-3." Id. at 1229.
The parties agreed that groundwater flows under the river. Id. The critical issue
became "whether contaminants from the Cumberland Farms site ever reached the
groundwater and thereafter found their way to WL-3." Id. at 1229-30.
117. Id. at 1233. The court summarized the three significant factors that tended to
prevent VOCs discharged into the Cumberland Farms storm drainage system from
reaching groundwater: (1) "the capture of VOCs by the petroleum distillates dumped
on the ground or into the drainage system; [2] the layer of peat underlying the ditch;
and [3] the process of volatilization or evaporation of VOCs from the site's surfaces, as
well as from the surface waters of the ditch." Id.
Nonetheless the court considered other potential contaminant sources. It concluded
that the evidence demonstrated that the Shield Company and the sewer leak represent
the likely upgradient sources which caused the contamination. Id.
118. Id. at 1235.
119. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text discussing the district court's
decision in Dedham Water.
120. Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir.
1989).
121. Id. at 1154.
122. Id. at 1153.
123. Id. at 1152.
124. Id. See supra note 24 for text of CERCLA § 107.
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releases of hazardous substances causing response costs.125 The court
further maintained that CERCLA imposes liability upon classes of per-
sons regardless of causation. 26 Finally, the court noted that a major-
ity of the CERCLA cases do not require a plaintiff to show traditional
proximate cause.127 Thus, the First Circuit joined with the weight of
authority 2 ' relieving plaintiffs from the burden of proving that the
defendant actually contaminated their property. 129
C. Causation for Recovery of Natural Resource Damages
The section 107(a)(4) causation scheme encompasses both claims for
response costs and claims for natural resource damages. 3 ' Curiously,
courts have applied section 107(a)(4) differently with respect to the two
types of claims.13' Whereas courts do not require plaintiffs to prove
proximate cause in cases involving response Costs, 13 2 the few courts
13 3
to address the issue in the natural resource damage context uniformly
require proof of proximate cause under CERCLA section 107(f). 134
125. Dedham Water, 889 F.2d at 1152.
126. Id. at 1153.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 16 & 47-93 and accompanying text discussing case law requir-
ing only a minimal causal nexus under CERCLA.
129. Dedham Water, 889 F.2d at 1154. The court, however, remanded the case for
a new trial to determine whether Dedham Water incurred response costs as a result of
Cumberland Farm's released substances. Id.
130. United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113 (D.N.J. 1983) ("The heading
used for § 107, 'Liability' denotes an intention to have this section define liability for the
entire act.").
131. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text discussing CERCLA cases re-
garding natural resource damages which apply a proximate cause standard. But see
supra notes 16 & 47-93 and accompanying text discussing CERCLA cases concerning
response costs requiring only a minimal causal nexus.
132. See supra notes 47-129 and accompanying text regarding CERCLA cases con-
cerning response costs.
133. See, eg., In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 716 F.
Supp. 676, 687 n.19 (D. Mass. 1989) (the plaintiff has the burden of establishing her
prima facie case by establishing a causal link between the releases and damages in ac-
cordance with CERCLA § 107(f)); Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.
Idaho 1986) ("strict liability [imposed under CERCLA] does not abrogate the necessity
of showing causation").
134. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1988). 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) provides in pertinent part:
"There shall be no recovery under the authority of subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)
of this section where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which
such damages resulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980." Id
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Unlike other CERCLA provisions, section 107(f) bars recovery for
damages to natural resources which occurred prior to CERCLA's en-
actment, applying prospectively only.135
Of district court cases ruling on natural resource damage relief,
Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co. 136 serves as a landmark case of sorts. In
Bunker Hill, the state sought recovery from an operations facility for
damages allegedly caused to natural resources for over a century. 37
The United States District Court for the District of Idaho held the past
owner and operator defendants liable for releases and damages occur-
ring after CERCLA's enactment. 138 It also held the defendants liable
for releases occurring prior to CERCLA's enactment that resulted in
post-enactment damage.
139
In articulating a standard for recovery, the court maintained that
strict liability requires a plaintiff to show causal linkage between the
defendant's harmful act and the harm allegedly suffered.' 4° The court
further noted that intent was irrelevant to the causation analysis. 4 '
The court pointed out that Congress expressly indicated in both House
and Senate reports that a plaintiff must prove actual causation for her
prima facie CERCLA case.1 42 Finally, the court reasoned that because
135. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 675. Courts unanimously agree that CERCLA is
retroactive in nature. This section, applying prospectively only, stands as an exception
to the rule.
See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) (Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactivity to clean up
wastes generated prior to enactment); United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp.,
680 F. Supp. 546, 556-57 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (§ 107(a)(4) applies retroactively allowing
plaintiffs to recover pre-enactment damages); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630
F. Supp. 1361, 1398-99 (D.N.H. 1985) (same); Town of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp.,
621 F. Supp. 663, 668-69 (D.N.J. 1985); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619
F. Supp. 162, 218-19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (same); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884,
898-99 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (same); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1076-
77 (D. Colo. 1985) (same); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1302-14
(N.D. Ohio 1983) (same). See generally Developments, supra note 2, at 1555 ("Congress
clearly intended CERCLA to apply retroactively, in order to clean up wastes generated
prior to enactment."). For text of CERCLA § 107(f), see supra note 134.
136. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
137. Id. at 674.
138. Id. at 675.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 674 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6136-37.
141. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 674.
142. Id.
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CERCLA imposes liability upon past owners and operators, damages
occurring "post-enactment" are recoverable even though the defend-
ant's releases occurred "pre-enactment." '43 In short, the Bunker Hill
court adopted common law principles of proximate causation when de-
termining liability for damages to natural resources.144
III. ANALYSIS
A. A Watered-Down Standard of Causation: Strengths and
Weaknesses
By interpreting CERCLA to require only a weakened standard of
causation for recovery of reponse costs, courts relieve plaintiffs of a
potentially substantial burden in establishing their prima facie case. A
weaker standard properly recognizes that the commingling of wastes
often occurs at disposal sites, thus making the task of identifying par-
ticular substances difficult and expensive. 145 Assuming a plaintiff
could identify each of the released substances, she would still need to
determine which generators produced which substances and calculate
their respective fractional contributions. 146 Some commentators have
argued that requiring a plaintiff to "fingerprint" every chemical would
unduly burden her cost recovery actions, eviscerate the statute, and
defeat the congressional purpose of indemnification.147
On the other hand, speculative links between the pollution and the
damage unfairly disadvantage many targeted defendants.148 Clean-up
costs usually fall within the multi-million dollar range.149 In many in-
stances, however, a defendant's facility may not have produced hazard-
ous substances found at a particular site.150 Arguably, a diluted
143. Id. at 675. See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v. Price, 537 F. Supp. 1103 (D.N.J. 1983).
144. Bunker Hill, 635 F. Supp. at 674.
145. Developments, supra note 2, at 1529.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Huber, Environmental Hazards and Liability Law, in LIABILrrY PERSPEC-
TIVES AND POLICY 128, 141 (Brookings Institution 1988) (the question of the defend-
ant's causation of the injury can rarely be answered precisely in cases involving "diffuse,
mass exposure, long latency risks").
149. Id. at 145.
150. Id.
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causation standard risks punishing the innocent if the test merely re-
quires showing first that a responsible party disposed of hazardous sub-
stances which were in fact released or threaten to be released, and
second that a similar substance is found at the contaminated site.151
Finally, by imposing liability upon targeted defendants for minimally
substantiated claims, courts ignore CERCLA's underlying policy that
responsible parties foot the clean-up bill.152
Beyond defeating congressional policy, a watered-down causation
standard raises serious public policy concerns.1 53 For example, a ma-
jority of insurance companies no longer provide coverage for pollution
liability because links between pollution and damage are so speculative
that adjusters cannot rationally price policies. 154 Also, the potential
risk of multi-million dollar lawsuits prompted some companies in-
volved in the clean-up of hazardous waste sites to abandon the business
altogether.155 Other companies condition their continuation of opera-
tions on indemnification agreements with the government.156 No sin-
gle business or insurance company is large or wealthy enough to absorb
typically enormous CERCLA damages and maintain its business on
solid economic footing.15 7 All told, CERCLA liability is as likely "to
make life more dangerous as it is to make life safer."'158
In contrast with the above, courts have not diluted the CERCLA
section 107(a)(4) causation element regarding claims for natural re-
source damages. 159 Rather, courts require a plaintiff to satisfy a tradi-
tional common law standard of proximate causation. 1" This disparity
cuts against assertions that only a weakened causation standard would
fully effectuate CERCLA's objectives. 161
151. See supra notes 16 & 47-93 and accompanying text discussing CERCLA cases
requiring minimal causation.
152. See supra notes 1-3 & 17-32 and accompanying text for discussion of CER-
CLA's legislative history and its underlying policy objectives.
153. See Huber, supra note 148, at 146-54 discussing the negative impact of CER-
CLA liability on insurance companies and other industries.
154. Id. at 146.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 148.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA
cases regarding natural resource damages.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 16 & 47-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases
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B. Alternative to a Diluted Causation Standard
At present, a majority of courts require a minimal causal nexus to
satisfy the prima facie case in CERCLA actions for response costs.162
The same courts, however, typically require plaintiffs to demonstrate
proximate cause in CERCLA actions for damages to natural re-
sources. 163 For the sake of doctrinal clarity and consistency, courts
should impose a single causation standard under section 107(a). 164
The standard that courts should require is the traditional notion of
proximate cause. 1
65
First, CERCLA's legislative history supports the use of proximate
causation. 166 The original House of Representatives bill that was to
indicating that a minimal causation standard would effectuate CERCLA's goals. But
see supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA cases re-
quiring proximate cause. For a discussion of the original version of the House report
expressly requiring a proximate cause test, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 16 & 47-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of CER-
CLA cases regarding response costs requiring only a minimal causal nexus for a plain-
tiff's prima facie case.
163. See supra notes 130-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA
cases regarding recovery for natural resource damages.
164. See generally Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73
GEo. L.J. 1389, 1391 (1985) (a single substantive controlling law will let the parties
know what they will face in litigation).
165. See Huber, supra note 148, at 154. Huber reasons that "[t]he simplest and
most readily available solution that is affordable, stable, and predictable is a return to
rigorous standards of proof within the liability system. Regrettably, that also appears to
be socially unacceptable to both the public and the courts." Id. See also Black &
Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 732
(1984) (outlining elements of scientifically rigorous proof in toxic tort litigation); Ep-
stein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377 (1985) (plaintiffs
should return to traditional causation principles. Recent attempts to expand them
through "market share liability" and "joint and several liability" concepts have proved
economically inefficient). But cf Elliott, Goal Analysis v. Institutional Analysis of Toxic
Compensation Systems, 73 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1357 (1985). According to Elliott, "Crimi-
nal law should be used to deter wrongful behavior. Compensation should be available
without proof of causation but such compensation would be limited and would operate
outside the traditional tort system. Only those plaintiffs who can establish causation
could utilize traditional tort remedies for toxic tort relief." Id. See also, Symposium,
Introduction, 73 GEo. L.J. 1355, 1355 (1985) ("Legal requirement of causation is irrele-
vant because judges and juries are effectively ignoring any such requirement in order to
reach socially desirable results. Instead we should turn our attention to reconstructing
our tort system around the idea of compensation."); Weinstein, supra note 164, at 1389
("The judiciary must help allocate compensation to victims of toxic torts. The judge
should play the role of the manager of mass disaster litigation.").
166. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text regarding CERCLA's legislative
history.
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become CERCLA provided for proximate causation. 167 Because the
Ninety-Sixth Congress debated this issue during its closing days, assur-
ance of CERCLA's passage demanded compromise. 168 Many mem-
bers of Congress feared that postponing CERCLA's enactment would
result in less stringent legislation. 169 Under the circumstances, this
ambiguity-producing omission suggests at most that Congress intended
for the judiciary to set the standard of causation under section 107.
In addition to effectuating congressional intent, a proximate cause
test serves CERCLA's underlying policy of allowing a plaintiff to re-
cover costs only from responsible parties. 170 By requiring a causal
nexus, courts will spare many innocent defendants from potentially
crippling liability. That result would encourage businesses and indus-
tries involved with hazardous waste disposal to continue and expand
operations rather than to shut down completely. 171 Those businesses
and industries, moreover, would continue to protect our environment
and enhance our economic welfare. Thus, a proximate cause standard
would enable a plaintiff to recover from responsible parties and in-
crease the involvement of businesses in the treatment of hazardous
waste. 172
Not only would a proximate cause test carry out congressional intent
and policy, but also a uniform causation test would produce consis-
tency and predictability in the law. 173 First, section 107 is the only
liability scheme in CERCLA. That suggests Congress intended only
167. See supra notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text for discussion of original
House version of CERCLA.
168. See Grad, supra note 2, at 1-2.
169. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of CERCLA's
legislative history.
170. See Huber, supra note 148, at 154. By requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate a
causal nexus between each particular defendant's harm and the resulting injury to a
plaintiff's facility, it is unlikely that innocent defendants will incur liability. Id. See
supra notes 1-3 & 17-32 and accompanying text regarding CERCLA's legislative his-
tory and underlying policy concerns.
171. Weinstein, supra note 164, at 1391.
172. "If the government paid more attention to the mitigation of risk - - if it didn't
leave Superfund liability hanging over everyone's head - - new companies would emerge
to clean up." Morgenson & Eisenstodt, Profits Are for Rape and Pillage, FORBES, Mar.
5, 1990, at 100 (quoting Roger Feldman, head of project finance at the Washington,
D.C. law firm of McDermott, Will & Emery).
173. Id.
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one causation test to cover all CERCLA actions. 7 4 Second, although
a majority of courts have adopted similar minimal causation require-
ments in one-site cases where the remedy is response costs, 175 courts in
two-site cases apply a variety of tests. 1 76 This disparity is patently un-
fair and may promote forum shopping. That eventuality defeats the
purpose of enacting federal law. Therefore, a uniform proximate cause
test for all CERCLA claims would put parties on notice regarding
what they will face in litigation and what they can expect its outcome
to be.177
C. Conclusion
Courts should reverse the current trend of requiring a plaintiff to
prove only minimal causation pursuant to CERCLA section 107. In-
stead, courts should strive for certainty and uniformity in CERCLA's
application and require a plaintiff to demonstrate proximate cause in
all CERCLA actions. As the government and private parties discover
greater numbers of abandoned waste sites and initiate clean-up opera-
tions, litigation involving cost recovery certainly will increase.178 This
underscores the need to promote CERCLA's underlying policies en-
suring the prompt clean-up of disposal sites and the imposition of lia-
bility upon responsible parties. 7 9 Adopting a proximate cause test
would best effectuate CERCLA's purpose. 8 °
Julie L. Mendel*
174. See supra notes 94-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of two-site
CERCLA cases.
175. Belthoff, supra note 1, at 163-65.
176. See supra notes 94-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of two-site
CERCLA cases.
177. See supra notes 47-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of one-site CER-
CLA cases.
178. Belthoff, supra note I, at 163-65.
179. See supra notes 1-3 & 17-32 and accompanying text for discussion of CER-
CLA policy objectives and legislative history.
180. See supra note 165 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible CER-
CLA causation reforms.
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